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Man is a Werewolf to Man: 





 In the nineteen sixties and seventies the question of Marx's humanism, his 
attachment to an idea of human nature, was hotly debated. In the years since that 
debate has subsided the question of Marx and the human has emerged in multiple 
sectors. The dominance of neoliberalism as policy has revived the notion of 
capitalism as human nature. At the same time the anti-humanism of 
poststructuralism has been replaced with posthumanism. There has also been a 
revival of the question of humanity in light of the anthropocene. Given all of these 
developments its seems worth posing the question of the human in Marx again. 
Taking its cue from the Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach which argues that the human 
essence is the ensemble of social relations, this essay examines the way in which 
labor constructs and destroys the generic figure of humanity. Ultimately, it argues 
that Marx can be understood as making a unique contribution to philosophical 
anthropology, not one that argues about any fixed essence, cooperative or 
competitive, but understands history to be the generation and corruption of different 
essences, of constituting the basis for solidarity and antagonism. 
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Long after the “humanist controversy” came and went, and lingering into the age of 
posthumanism, the question of Marx’s philosophical anthropology lingers. There are 
immediate reasons for this, tied to contemporary ideology. Neoliberalism’s 
theoretical battle against Marxism has often claimed the terrain of human nature 
rather than history and social relations. One could argue that this story began long 
before neoliberalism with Adam Smith’s famous declaration of mankind’s tendency 
to “barter, truck, and exchange” but it has been extended and developed into theories 
of human nature which make the calculation of costs and benefits the entirety of 
thinking, willing, and desiring. Humanity becomes human capital, and the attempt to 
maximize benefits and minimize costs becomes the exemplary matrix of every 
possible action. The debate between capitalism and communism is often reduced to 
a debate between competition and cooperation, or egoism or altruism, as defining 
aspects of human nature, as if we never left Political Philosophy 101. Such a debate 
does a disservice to Marx, who had little to say about some supposed altruistic 
nature and much to say about the historical and social conditions of capitalism. One 
could say that it changes the question to an irreducibly academic debate, human 
nature remains a question than can never be finally answered, but it is precisely this 
turn towards human nature that reflects its particular brand of “capitalist realism.”1 
The appeals to human nature take the existing attitudes and comportments of 
capitalism, competition and self-interest, attitudes and comportments that can be 
generally understood to be products of capitalist relations and presents them as a 
cause. Neoliberalism, like liberal apologetics for capitalism that preceded it, gets its 
strength not from a theory of human nature articulated in philosophical texts but from 
a concrete experience of buying and selling, of what Marx called “the sphere of 
exchange.” Or, more to the point, neoliberalism in the broad sense of the term, as a 
culture revolution in which the quotidian experiences of work and consumption, 
especially work which is increasingly individuated and precarious, generate an idea 
of human nature as their after image. An effect appears as a cause.2  Opposed to this 
neoliberal claim of human nature, we have not only the anti-humanist claim that  
“humanity” is always an effect of power and discourse, but the attempt to dispense 
with the human altogether, situating it in a post-human natural and technological 
processes that exceed it. Finally, there is the opposite interest in the human in the 
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return of philosophical anthropology in the works of Etienne Balibar, Paolo Virno, and 
Bernard Stiegler.  
Thus, it is necessary to return to the question of the human in Marx, its place in 
the critique of political economy, not to restage the debates of “humanist Marxism, 
but to confront the current theoretical conjuncture, a conjuncture that can be 
provisionally defined in terms of the dominant, neoliberal humanism, the emergent, 
post-humanism, and the residual, anti-humanism. It is necessary to ask the question 
again how does Capital, make sense just not of human nature, but what could be 
broadly defined as the humanity of workers and capital? Or put differently, if Marx 
does not espouse some ideal of humanity as essentially cooperative, as something 
other than competition, then what the is philosophical anthropology at work in 
Capital? Or asked differently how does Capital articulate the limits of an 
anthropological understanding of the economy?  
 
Homo Laborans Revisited  
 
 Beyond the facile reduction of Marx to a moralism of cooperation and 
communal living the other most persistent, and more reputable myth of Marx’s 
philosophical anthropology is that he considered the essence of humanity to be 
labour. This is a recurring theme in criticisms of Marx from Heidegger to Baudrillard. 
Its central thesis, gleaned in many ways from a reading of Marx’s eighteen forty-four 
manuscripts, is that labour defines the essence of humanity, defining its particular 
essence and activity. This definition posits a somewhat novel definition of the human 
essence, defining this essence as an activity as transformation of world and self, a 
second nature not a fixed and eternal nature.3 The problem of applying this critique to 
Capital is that it overlooks the focus and reduction of that text, dedicated as it is to 
“the critique of political economy.” The centrality of labour as an activity in Capital 
follows capital itself: just as capital confronts us as an “immense accumulation of 
commodities,” it also confronts us as an immense reinterpretation of human activity 
as labour. This is not to say that labour is addressed by Marx as something entirely 
historical and contingent having no bearing on the essence of humanity; it is 
precisely the connection of the historical and the anthropological, the contingent and 
the necessary that is central to Marx’s investigation. Labour is not an expression of 
some essence of humanity, but its organization cannot be separated from the 
question of human existence.  
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Capital, as it is well known, begins with an examination of the dual nature of 
the commodity, as use value and exchange value, a dual nature which in turn stems 
from the dual nature of labour as abstract and concrete. The fact that labour 
functions as a corollary to the much more central analysis of the commodity form 
has often led to its specific tensions and problems being overlooked. Concrete and 
abstract labour are the conceptual corollaries of exchange value and use value, the 
first is defined by concrete particularity and the second is defined by abstract 
equivalence.  As much as the former serve as the necessary corollary of the later, in 
some case as both condition and effect, this should not obscure the particular 
innovation of the concept of abstract labour, and the specific problems of the 
conjunction of the abstract and concrete and labour.  
As with the commodity, there is no immediate mystery to concrete labour; it is 
the specific work of weaving, tailoring, forging, and so on, the specific work of an 
individual, undertaking a specific task. As much as this concept seems self-evident, 
like something from a children’s book dividing a village into butcher, baker, 
candlestick maker, there are a few riddles concealed in this concept. As with use 
value, the emphasis is on the concrete particularity of labour. My labour, your labour, 
is then absolutely irreducible to that of others. It is possible to then see concrete 
labour as something irreducibly specific, as being not only the specific task of a 
specific individual, but also the singularity of a given moment. As with use value, it is 
hard to comprehend how something so singular can be exchanged at all; this is of 
course the riddle that Capital opens with, an attempt to think the ground of that 
which is taken for granted.4 Concrete labour is only one side of the labour process, 
however, it concrete specificity is also confronted with its abstract generality. The 
idea that labour is the source of value is, after all not Marx’s discovery, it can be found 
in Smith and Ricardo. What is unique to Marx, or what Marx gives himself credit for is 
the dual nature of labour, abstract and concrete, which is “the secret to the whole 
critical conception.”5 Given that abstract labour is the solution to the riddle of 
commodity exchange, explaining how it is that commodities of different qualities and 
uses can be treated as equivalent, the question of its own condition of possibility is 
particularly important. Marx would seem to offer two reasons. First, Marx covers what 
could be considered an anthropological ground of abstract labour, arguing that the 
different forms of labour have as their common denominator the fact that they are 
produced by different human beings. As Marx writes,  
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If we leave aside the determinate quality of productive activity, and therefore 
the useful character of the labour, what remains is its quality of being an 
expenditure of human labour-power.  Tailoring and weaving, although they are 
qualitatively different productive activities, are both a productive expenditure of 
human brains, muscles, nerves, hands, etc. and in this sense both human 
labour.  They are merely two different forms of the expenditure of human 
labour.6 
 
 This assertion of a natural, human basis of abstract labour, of a communality is 
contradicted, or at least put in tension with Marx’s assertion that the abstract nature 
of labour is not an anthropological given but a social process. It is the very fact that 
labour is exchanged, is treated as interchangeable that provides its abstract 
commonality. Its common basis is not to be found in the recesses of the human 
body, but in the social relations themselves. As Marx writes in the same section,  
 
 However, let us remember that commodities possess an objective character 
 as values only in so far as they are all expressions of an identical social 
 substance, human labor, that the objective character as values is therefore 
 purely social.7  
 
 Marx seems to vacillate between a kind of nominalism and realism of abstract 
labour, placing the abstract quality alternately in the biological identity of humanity as 
a species or the social relations of a capitalist society. This apparent ambivalence 
brings to mind the Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, which stated that the “human essence 
is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of 
social relations.”8 The Sixth Thesis states as a principle what Capital presents as a 
tension: the human essence, the very identity of humanity right down to biology and 
the body itself, exists only in and through the historical articulation of social relations.9 
Abstract labour, and with it abstract humanity, did not exist prior to the social 
relations of wage labour. As Marx indicates, the effect of this transformation extend 
well beyond the restricted domain of an economy, to encompass religion,  
 
For a society of commodity producers, whose general social relation of 
production consists in the fact that they treat their products as commodities, 
hence as values, and in this material [sachlich] form bring their individual, 
private labors into relation with each other as homogenous human labor, 
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Christianity with its religious cult of man in the abstract, more particularly in its 
bourgeois development, i.e. in Protestantism, Deism, etc. is the most fitting 
form of religion.10 
 
 One could read Marx here as completing Feuerbach’s project. It is not enough 
to reduce theology to anthropology, to find the figure of humanity beneath the 
projection of god, one must recognize that there is no humanity as such, there are 
only specific social relations which produce and reproduce a given figure of 
humanity. God, especially that of Deism and Protestantism, is not the product of 
some general longing of humanity, but of the particular society organized by the 
abstraction of wage labour. Other societies, other mode of productions, produce 
different ideas of humanity and God.  
The question is not one of completing Feuerbach’s critique, but of grasping a 
human essence that exists in and through its social relations. Paolo Virno has 
developed the philosophical anthropology behind such a concept of humanity, using 
“natural historical” to characterize exactly this aspect of capitalism. Taking inspiration 
from the philosophical anthropology developed by such writers an Arnold Gehlen, 
Virno begins from the premise of a humanity that must be understood as 
undetermined and open to the world, as lacking in instincts that delineate a 
particular response to a particular aspect of the world.11 This does not mean that 
human beings are entirely outside of biology or nature, existing as something defined 
entirely by history and contingency, but that the biological capacities that define 
humanity, the capacity for speech, for forming habits,  as well as the need for clothes 
and other forms of artifice to survive, exist only insofar as they are actualized in 
specific historical situations. Language is a generic capacity, as is the need to wear 
some sort of clothing, but this generic capacity can only be realized in specific 
historical formations, in specific social relations. Human nature is not something that 
stands apart from history, it is not some kind of constant, but a set of general 
capacities that are actualized in specific historical situations.12  
This general condition is transformed in contemporary capitalism. Capitalism 
is not just another historically specific actualization of the generic possibilities of 
humanity but a putting to work of this abstract human potential itself. The generic 
equivalence of labour power is the generic indifference of humanity. “Meta-history 
irrupts into ordinary history in the none-too-sublime guise of labour-power.”13 Virno’s 
first formulation, that of abstract human potential, as the biological basis for labour 
power, is a formulation more or less corresponding to formal subsumption, to the 
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early stage of capital in which all that is altered is the formal relationship of wage 
labour, the worker sells his or her labour power rather than producing for use or the 
selling of goods. At this stage, the technological and social composition of labour 
remains unchanged. Exploitation is the exploitation of absolute surplus value, the 
exploitation of the difference between the time spent reproducing the costs of labour, 
necessary labour, and the surplus produced. For Virno real subsumption has to be 
understood as not just a transformation of this economic relation, as capital 
restructures the technological and social conditions of labour shifting exploitation 
from the quantitative expansion of the working day to its qualitative intensification, 
but also a fundamental alteration of the anthropological basis of labour power. In real 
subsumption it is not just that one sells one’s capacity to do work, a capacity that 
always remains distinct from its actualizations; what is sold, what is put to work, is 
nothing other than the very capacity to develop new capacities. What contemporary 
capitalism puts to work are not just actualized potentials, not this or that habit, but the 
very potential to create habits itself. As Virno stresses with respect to the “general 
intellect,” the socialized knowledge that has become a productive force, this intellect 
is not the specific knowledge of the sciences or computer programing, but the very 
capacity to learn and create. “General intellect should not necessarily mean the 
aggregate of the knowledge acquired by the species, but the faculty of thinking; 
potential as such, not its countless particular realizations. The general intellect is 
nothing but the intellect in general.” 14 Contemporary capitalism, the capitalism of 
services, precarity and mobility, is not just one historical articulation of the 
actualization of the natural capacity to learn and develop habits, but is, in some 
sense, the exploitation of this very capacity as capacity. What capital puts to work is 
not this or that specific manifestation of human nature, but human nature, humanity 
as potentiality, itself.  
 
Human nature returns to the centre of attention not because we are finally 
dealing with biology rather than history, but because the biological 
prerogatives of the human animal have acquired undeniable historical 
relevance in the current productive process.15  
 
 Previous societies, even earlier stages of capital, were grounded upon the 
production and reproduction of a particular set of habits, concepts, and 
comportments, but with capitalism what comes to light is not this or that habit, but 
the very capacity of gaining (and losing) them. “Precarity and nomadism lay bare at 
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the social level the ceaseless and omnilateral pressure of a world that is never an 
environment.”16 Capital is a fundamental short circuit of the anthropological condition: 
if all previous societies have resolved the potential to speak, understand, and act into 
an actual language, specific forms of knowledge and a set of habits, contemporary 
capitalism turns to that potential itself, making it manifest and productive, without 
ever solidifying into a set of habits, a second nature, or a world. All that is solid melts 
into air.  
  Virno’s trajectory is one of the increasing becoming abstract of labour power, 
as capital begins to appropriate more and more of the generic capacities underlying 
labour power. Capital not only puts to work abstract humanity, but anthropogenesis 
itself. One has to wonder about what remains of concrete labour in this increasing 
becoming abstract of labour. As much as contemporary work can be understood as 
an actualization of the generic capacities of humanity it still is actualized in a specific 
individual’s endeavour. The paradoxical actualization of the virtual, the selling of 
labour power as the potential to not only work but communicate and interact, still 
manifests itself in particular actions and over the course of a particular work day. For 
Virno the concreteness of this becoming abstract is manifest in two different 
phenomena. First, there is the general problem of capitalist historicity, that unlike all 
previous modes of production, capital appears to be not just a specific actualization 
of this generic potential, a specific language, custom, set of habits, etc., but the 
actualization of potential itself. This creates a particular mystification, a particular 
appearance in which capital appears as human nature.  
 When capitalism appropriates an anthropological requisite like the potential to 
produce, the accent can fall either on the contextualized ways in which the 
appropriation takes place, or on the indeterminate character of this requisite, 
pertaining to any epoch or society. The second emphasis points to the ‘bourgeois 
narrow-mindedness, which regards the capitalist forms of production of production 
as absolute forms—hence as eternal, natural forms of production.’ It is the concept of 
labour-pour that explains the spread of state of mind (little matter where it be 
melancholic of euphoric) inspired by the “end of history.”17 
 While Virno’s exploitation of abstraction offers an interesting answer to the 
question of “capitalist realism,” the inability to think or imagine beyond capitalism, it 
approaches this question primarily from the perspective of historical consciousness, 
of a general awareness or failure to think historicity. From a more individuated, or 
subjective dimension, we could ask how does the increasing tendency of 
anthroprogenesis, of the becoming human of the labour process constitute a 
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particular mode of the production of subjectivity? Virno offers two responses to this 
question. First, he expands the definition of alienation to encompass a loss of not 
only one’s productive activity but the entirety of social relations.  
  
 Nobody is as poor as those who see their own relation to the presence of 
 others, that is to say, their own communicative faculty, their own possession of 
 a language, reduced to wage labor.18  
  
 Against this generalized alienation Virno also charts a more affirmative version 
of this experience in the changing contours of the term “professionalism.” Whereas 
the term used to be associated with a specific set of highly trained expertise, a kind 
of personalization of the general intellect as forms of knowledge, it has increasingly 
become associated with an attitude a subjective comportment. Job postings 
increasing demand a professional demeanor and attitude, an attitude that is more 
associated with a way of being in the world than any claim on specific knowledge. 
  
 “Professionality on the other hand is seen as a subjective property, a form of 
 know-how inseparable from the individual person; it is a sum of knowledges, 
 experiences, attitudes, and a certain sensibility.” 19 
  
 Alienation and professionalism, the impoverishment of experience and a 
generalized opportunism, constitute two sides of contemporary experience, they are 
the basis of its ambiguity. The present appears as both utter impoverishment and 
total potential, existence is precarious but everything seems possible.  
 Virno’s emphasis on the ambiguity of contemporary work, caught as it were 
between the alienation of anthropogenesis, the transformation of the most basic 
human capacities of language and interaction into commodities, and 
professionalization, the valorization of a subjectivity that is both engaged and 
abstract, capable of applying itself to diverse situations, returns us to a hidden 
subjective dimension of the split between concrete and abstract labour. As much as 
concrete and abstract labour can be understood as corresponding to two different 
sides of the commodity, use value and exchange value, they also can be understood 
as corresponding to two different subjective comportments and evaluations. One 
can identify with concrete labour, with the specific task and job at hand, especially as 
that work becomes not just a particular task, but a subjective position, being a 
butcher, baker, or candlestick maker, and abstract labour with the general task of 
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being employed, of being a part of capital. Concrete and abstract labour then 
constitute not just two sides of the labour process, always in tension, but two sides of 
subjectification. What Virno charts is a generalized becoming abstract of the labour 
process as the identification with a concrete task necessarily gives way to the 
identification with the labour process itself. In a similar manner Frédéric Lordon has 
argued that the contemporary labour process is defined by a subjectification of 
abstract labour. The ideal subject of contemporary labour is the entrepreneur, 
someone who does not identify with any particular activity or enterprise, but with the 
very possibility of being employed and engaged in labour.20 If formal subsumption 
can be understood as the devalorization of concrete labour, specific activities are no 
longer pursued because of their use or use value, then real subsumption can be 
understood as the revalorization of abstract labour, it is subjectivity as abstract 
labour.   
 
The Hidden Abode of the Post-Human 
  
As much as it is possible to see a figure of humanity, of a generic humanity, 
appear alongside abstract labour, this is not the entirety of the connection between 
labour and the human. It cannot be because in some sense abstract labour is labour 
viewed from the perspective of exchange, of the market. Labour is only viewed as 
abstract and interchangeable from the perspective of the labour market. Marx’s 
assertion of the connection between abstract labour and abstract humanity appears 
in the section on the fetish of commodities. It thus appears in the section in which 
Marx is discussing the non-appearance of abstract labour as labour. The commodity 
appears to have value, exchange value, as one of its physical attributes, and it is 
alongside this appearance there is the appearance of the general idea of humanity 
as something of an afterthought. Or, to be more precise, as much as abstract labour 
appears it would seem to appear on the labour market, and mediated through 
ideological forms such as religion and law which present it as the generic idea of 
humanity, while its economic role is obscured by the fetish of the commodity. That 
the assertion of the connection of humanity and labour is articulated in the section 
on commodity could give credit to the idea of humanity itself as a kind of fetish, albeit 
an ambiguous one. One could argue, as Marx does in The Communist Manifesto, 
that abstract humanity is not just an idea, but is itself a practice as capital overcomes 
the division between nations and even overcoming differences “of age and sex” as 
all become instruments of labour.21 The ice waters of calculation drown out all 
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particularity in the universality of exploitation. However, this is not to say that this 
universal is without its positive effects, as a real abstraction it carries with it the after-
image of a kind of universality, a universality integral to the very notion of the working 
class. As much as the worker, the subjectification of abstract labour, can be 
considered to ambiguously imposed between exploitation and universality. In order 
to move beyond this ambiguous appearance it is necessary to move beyond 
exchange into production, into the hidden abode of production.  This ambiguity is 
only deepened by not just its proximity to the fetish, but its structural homology. Like 
the fetish character of the commodity, abstract labour necessarily obscures the 
conditions of its emergence. These conditions include the truly non-universal 
conditions of housework, reproductive labor, and the racial and sexual division of 
labour.22 As Marxist-Feminists as well as the different currents of black Marxism have 
underscored is that not only does capital emerge from the uneven and combined 
development of unwaged reproductive labour and slavery, this uneven and 
combined condition is the necessary precondition of its emergence.23 It is not just that 
abstract labour is incomplete and partial, not actually reflecting a true universal, but 
the conditions of its non-universality, the persistence of a gender division between 
housework and other forms of labour, are its necessary conditions. Unwaged labour, 
whether in the form of slavery, at its onset, and social reproduction, as it develops, 
are the necessary conditions for the centrality of wage labour. The figure of the 
worker, of abstract labour, is necessarily incomplete.  
Moving beyond this ambiguity entails moving beyond the sphere of exchange, 
even the exchange of labour power, to enter into the hidden abode of production. 
Here we are confronted with another contradiction, not that between the natural and 
social basis for abstract labour, or even the contradiction between the universality of 
the image of the worker and the particularity of its history, but between the generic 
idea of labour and its specific history. Part Three of Capital Volume One of Capital, 
the first section on the labour process, begins with a generic discussion of labour 
“independent of any specific social formation.”24 Marx then outlines a general schema 
of labour, of any labour process, as consisting of “purposeful activity, that is work 
itself,” the object upon which such activity is undertaken, and the instrument of that 
undertaking. Even at this general, and even anthropological stage, Marx’s schema 
includes the kernel of a historical element. Work is not just a transformation of the 
external world, of nature, but it is simultaneously a transformation of the worker’s 
own nature. It is at once a static schema and a matrix for historical transformation. 
Nonetheless it is still striking to see in the subsequent sections that deal with the 
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specifically capitalist mode of production, with large scale industry and cooperation, 
Marx writes, “Capital now sets the worker to work, not with a manual tool, but with a 
machine that itself handles the tools.”25 This displacement of the initial schema 
culminates in the worker’s reduction to nothing other than “conscious organ of the 
machine,” an eye overseeing a process that he or she neither initiates nor 
comprehends. This fragmentation and reduction of the body to a part, an organ in a 
larger machine, is not just limited to the body, the hand or the eye, but it crosses the 
Cartesian divide becoming an aspect of the mind as well. Mental operations can be 
subject to the same repetition and fragmentation.26  It is in this context that we get a 
very different account of the general intellect, not the abstract intellect of 
anthropogenetic potential, but the ossified and fragmented intellect. This is how Marx 
writes about the general intellect in his correspondence for The New York Daily 
Tribune 
 
 ...the progressive division of labour has, to a certain extent, emasculated the 
 general intellect of the middle-class men by the circumscription of all their 
 energies and mental faculties within the narrow spheres of their mercantile, 
 industrial and professional concerns.27  
 
What begins with a Promethean schema of the transformation of nature and 
humanity ends in humanity’s destruction and fragmentation.  
Once again we are confronted with a contradiction of sorts. This is not the 
contradiction between use value and exchange value, abstract labour and concrete 
labour that sets a dialectic in motion, but a contradiction that is not explicitly 
thematized by Marx (or Marxism), like the apparent contradiction between the 
biological and social basis of abstract labour. As with the abstract labour discussed 
above, it is perhaps necessary to interpret this contradiction in the most generous 
way possible, to read it for what it might articulate rather than simply as a failing on 
Marx’s part. What it articulates, and puts to work, is in some sense the opposite, 
perhaps even dialectical of Marx’s concept of the abstract labour as the “ensemble of 
social relations.” If the ensemble of social relations can constitute an anthropological 
figure, defining humanity as first a universal figure of labour, and then the 
manifestation of its anthropogenesis, they can also constitute its destruction, its 
reduction to organs and parts of a productive process. The former makes it possible 
to grasp what is at stake in the latter. It is not just that the worker is reduced to the 
conscious organ of the machine during the hours of work in a kind of dead end job, 
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but this destruction is the destruction of the knowledge and integrity constitutive of 
humanity. Not the exploitation of anthropogenesis, but its destruction. As Bernard 
Stiegler argues the reduction of the worker to a conscious organ of the machine can 
be understood as an extension of proletarianization to the point of the destruction of 
the very constitution of individual subjectivity.28 As Balibar describes this 
anthropological destruction.  
 
This process of autonomization-intellectualization-materialization of 
‘knowledge’ determines more and more the exercise of the ‘property rights’ 
and thereby individuality.  But at the same time it renders more and more 
uncertain the identity of proprietors, the identity of the ‘subject’ of property. 
Then we are no longer dealing merely with a mechanism of division of human 
nature that practically contradicts the requirement of freedom and equality.  
Instead we are dealing with a dissolution of political individuality.29 
 
 This is something other than the division of mental and manual labour. In part 
because the very idea of a worker reduced to a conscious organ suggests that this 
deskilling cuts transversally across this division, the mind like the hand can be 
subject to the same reduction the same repetition of an activity. In each case the 
minimal constitution of the constitution of subjectivity, or anthropogenesis, is 
undermined by the deskilling of labour. Labour which is first presented as the 
elevation and self-transformation of the human becomes its destruction. The social 
ensemble must be grasped as the simultaneous destruction and elevation of the 
very conditions of humanity, elevating some to their absolute potential, to the 
becoming of potential, and others are reduced to the destruction of their potential. 
Of course, Marx considered such an anthropological division in his earliest 
writing on Capital. In the Eighteen Forty Four Manuscripts Marx writes the following: 
 
Political economy conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labor 
by not considering the direct relationship between the worker (labor) and 
production. It is true that labor produces for the rich wonderful things – but for 
the worker it produces privation. It produces palaces – but for the worker, 
hovels. It produces beauty – but for the worker, deformity. It replaces labor by 
machines, but it throws one section of the workers back into barbarous types 
of labor and it turns the other section into a machine. It produces intelligence – 
but for the worker, stupidity, cretinism.30 
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 It is worth asking how Marx’s argument in Capital (as well as The Grundrisse) 
differs from this early assertion. First of all, the condition is transformed, it is no longer 
property, private property, as the single cause, but the entirety of economic and 
technical conditions of labour. It has been transformed from determination to 
overdetermination. Second, the terms of opposition are more complex, and multiple, 
the division is not between workers and the rich, but are internal to the productive 
process itself. Even within the supposedly unified group of workers of the general 
intellect there is a division between the ossified organs and generic capacity. This 
division does not map neatly onto any division of class or wage: as Virno argues, it is 
often the poorly compensated worker of the service industry that has to contend with 
the most uncertainty, novelty, and contingency, putting to work the generic capacity 
of language and creation. Against this we could contrast the worker in a highly 
specialized form of knowledge, the university professor, copywriter, and lawyer, who 
repeats the same intellectual formulas. However, even this contrast fails to capture 
the way in which one can find the same processes, the same reduction and 
expansion of human capacities at work in the same individual, the same society. To 
paraphrase Balibar, at the exact moment that the world becomes unified 
economically it becomes violently divided anthropologically.31 
 
 
Living Labour and Undead Exploitation  
  
 The combined and uneven destruction of the worker cannot be simply 
opposed to some enrichment of the capitalist. It is not a simple inversion where the 
poverty of one is the enrichment of the other. In fact, any attempt to produce a figure 
of the bourgeois, of the capitalist, in capital would come up short. This is another 
effect of the centrality of labour, of beginning from the perspective of labour, those 
who do not labour are simply left to the margins and blank spaces. The capitalist 
appears as “moneybags” as the bearer of a function of capital. There is one notable 
exception to this, and that is the chapter on the working day.  
 The chapter on the working day has a particular status in the structure of 
Capital. It offers the most detailed discussion of conditions of the working class in 
England, so much so that it at times seems like Marx’s attempt to offer his own 
version of Engels’s book of that name. However, it is not without its own reflection on 
the anthropology of capital, on the conception of human nature that is put to work by 
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the capitalist. This anthropology is foreground by the general logic of conflict 
between capitalist and worker, a logic inscribed in the very status of labour power as 
a commodity.  As Marx writes,  
 
On the other hand, the peculiar nature of the commodity sold implies a limit to 
its consumption by the purchaser, and the worker maintains his right as a 
seller when he wishes to reduce the working day to a particular normal length. 
There is here therefore an antinomy, of right against right, both equally bearing 
the seal of the law of exchange. Between equal rights, force decides.32 
 
It is against this general logic of forces, a conflict that, as Marx stresses, exceeds any 
other limits, moral, and natural. It is in this context that Marx sardonically mentions 
that “Accordingly to the anthropology of the capitalists, the age of children ended at 
10 or at the outside, 11.”33 The “anthropology of capitalists” is one in which the only 
factor of humanity that registers is its capacity to be put to work. It is an anthropology 
without sleep, childhood, and even food, in which humanity is nothing other than 
exploitable labour power. This anthropology is not produced speculatively, but is 
manufactured in the factories.34 
 If one shifts the genitive from the “anthropology of the capitalist” to an 
examination of the particular Marx’s understanding of the humanity of the capitalist, 
the matter is just as striking. Marx adopts the voice of the worker, addressing the 
capitalist as follows,  
  
 You may be a model citizen, perhaps a member of the R.S.P.C.A. [Royal 
 Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals], and you may be in the odour 
 of sanctity as well; but the thing you represent when you come face to face 
 with me has no heart in its breast.35  
  
 Marx’s infamous methodological claim that he would treat individuals as 
merely “bearers” of economic relations receives its justification. Capitalism itself is 
indifferent to motivations and intentions. Just as the capitalist is indifferent to the 
humanity of the worker, capitalism is indifferent to the humanity of the capitalist. “As a 
capitalist, he is only capital personified.” Between equal abstractions force decides. 
However, Marx goes farther than this point. It is in the chapter on The Working Day 
that Marx makes his famous remark stating that the capitalist is “vampire like, living 
only by sucking living labour.” It is not just that capitalism is indifferent to the 
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humanity of the worker: it is actively hostile to it, inhabiting it like some kind of 
monster. It is not just the vampire that Marx invokes, but also the Werewolf, another 
monster that inhabits humanity with an insatiable desire. Capital appears as a motley 
collection of every folktale and monster movie.  
 The chapter on the Working Day offers a striking combination of not only 
ethnographic detail, but political struggle, it is the only chapter of Capital in which the 
working class appears as an active subject, struggling for the ten hour bill in 
England, a general logic of forces, and a polemical phantasmagoria of monsters. The 
combination of these dimensions could be read in moralizing tone, the heroic 
working class confronts the monster that is capital, or they could be understood as 
another chapter in the generation and constitution of anthropology in Capital. First, it 
extends the destruction of subjectivity from the worker to the capitalist. The worker is 
reduced to a conscious organ of the machine, while the capitalist becomes the 
personification of a ceaseless desire for surplus value that exceeds it. The class 
struggle is not a struggle between different classes of individuals, but a struggle that 




Where does the examination of the anthropology of labour and its limits in and 
around Capital leave us? It is possible to sketch out two possible conclusions. First, if 
the grand philosophical debate of human nature is framed between Thomas 
Hobbes’ assertion that “man is a wolf to man” on one side, that humanity is locked in 
a vicious competition which can only be contained but never ultimately cancelled by 
the state, and Spinoza’s “man is a god to man” on the other, the idea that nothing is 
more useful to human life than the combined effort of humanity, then Marx offers a 
third formulation, “man is a werewolf to man.” This third position is the assertion that 
human conflict and sociability have less to do with some natural basis for 
antagonism or cooperation, than the extent to which humanity itself is thoroughly 
transformed by its constitutive practices and relations, becoming something other. 
With the added caveat that there is no human nature outside of this process of 
transformation and possession: the human essence is nothing other than the 
ensemble of social relations, including those that make it other than itself and 
ultimately hostile to itself. The human world is a world of the commodity form, 
abstract labour, the general intellect, and conscious organs, a world of gods and 
monsters.  
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 Second, and perhaps more importantly, Marx’s investigation of the constitution 
and destruction of humanity through labour, reveals that the question cannot be a 
matter of being for or against the human. Nor is it a matter of declaring the current 
age to be the bold era of the posthuman. We have always been posthuman, the very 
idea of humanity is inseparable from its social ensemble, from its organization and 
destruction. What Marx suggests is another series of questions, it is not a matter of 
being for or against an essence, or declaring an essence to be surpassed, but of 
understanding how this essence is produced and organized. Moreover, it then 
becomes a matter of transforming practices in order to maximize the conditions of 
liberation and cooperation, to make it more of a world of gods than monsters. That is 
the revolutionary project.  
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